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The forms of folklore available for examination and the methods of transmission by 
which they have spread have, in recent years, greatly expanded due to the increased ability 
that developments in technology have given people to communicate over great distances in 
short periods of time. Those who frequent chat rooms, and use instant messenger programs 
have developed their own folkspeech; online communities function according to their own 
sets of customary behavior; and people represent themselves with scraps of art cobbled 
together into images that distinguish themselves from their fellow users. These images, 
referred to as icons, are the cyber art of which my title speaks. These images, the people 
who use them, and the ways that cycles of these images come to be developed are our 
primary points of concern. It is the existence of these cycles of images that call this 
phenomenon to the folklorist’s attention. The environment of the Internet gives us the 
opportunity to engage in virtual ethnography, to discover new artifacts and explore the 
system of ideas that has led to their creation. 
The Internet must not be dismissed by researchers as merely a repository for jokes 
and urban legends or a new vehicle for the kinds of material that have been passed as 
Xeroxed copies for the past thirty years. “It is a ‘virtual’ home to many millions who have 
gone ahead and made the Net a space in which to create a lived culture” (Mason, 1996:4). 
Culture is not only being preserved and transmitted through the Internet like butterflies 
under glass, it is being actively created. 
LiveJournal is a blogging community where, in addition to personal blogs, users 
can participate in “communities” that are centered around a vast array of topics. Users 
represent themselves in these communities with little 100 x 100 pixel ‘icons’. Depending 
on one’s account status, one can have between six and a hundred icons that can be changed 
from post to post to express moods or comment on the contents of one’s post. 
These icons can contain any kind of subject matter. LiveJournal officially refers to 
them as userpics (that is, user pictures). This term, as well as the frequent use of the term 
avatar to denote these pictures, suggests that it is expected that the image will represent the 
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user themselves. This does happen. Some users do use pictures of themselves as some or all 
of their icons. Some use cartoon images of themselves created by image generators that 
allow you to use the hair, eye shape, nose shape, etc. of your choice to create a cartoon that 
looks like you. Aside from these cartoonish userpics, however, icons depicting the user are 
relatively rare. Icons become of interest to the folklorist when they are found to occur in 
cycles. 
LiveJournal users draw their subject matter for these icons from many different 
areas. One of the more striking examples of the development of an icon cycle is the “OMG 
racecar bling bling” cycle. The speed with which this cycle took off is unusual, but serves 
as a good illustration of the manner in which these ideas proliferate. OMG is an 
abbreviation of the exclamation “Oh, my God”. 
The genesis of this particular cycle is very well documented. On February 24, 2005, 
the instigating post was made in the community Metaquotes. Metaquotes is a forum for 
people to post funny or insightful things that they have come across elsewhere on 
LiveJournal. The instigating post, made by a user called Sigma7, reads as follows: 
The OMG No Child Left Behind LOL!!1! Act 
Sometimes it's all in the delivery. This comment from just_3_apples 
absolutely amused me to the point of honking out loud.... (My first post 
here, apologies if I err.) 
Oh my. 
As most of you know, for my community service, I volunteer in a second 
grade classroom. I help students, clean stuff up, etc. 
Today, I was going through a pile of papers, and found one with a picture 
that one of the children had drawn, which had a caption that read: 
OMG racecar bling bling. 
I am in a quandary. Several things astound me in regards to this. For one 
thing..."OMG." For another, "bling bling." But most puzzling of all, it was 
not a picture of a racecar. It was a picture of a monkey. 
I'm a little disturbed by this, actually (sigma7, 2/24/2005). 
The other users saw this as a fruitful subject for icon art, although it would be 
incomprehensible to anyone unfamiliar with the post that generated it. The very first 
comment in response to this post read, “Who is going to step up and make the icon?” 
(lots42, 2/24/2005). 25 minutes later, theiving_gypsy posted the following: 
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Sigma7 responded to this with “Both you and darthfox did a better job. But I found that 
very pic, too, and tried using it. My l33t icon skills abandon me” (2/24/2005). Sigma7’s 
claim that she had failed to make a similar icon from that same picture did not prevent her 
from contributing to the nascent icon cycle, using the following icon in the post just cited: 
 
Seven minutes after theiving_gypsy’s response to the challenge to turn this post into an 
icon, darthfox added these: 
 
Sixteen minutes later, from peeeeeeet and playing on the popular notion amongst his 
detractors that President Bush looks like a chimpanzee: 
 
And some six hours later, peeeeeeet added this one: 
 
Genepool23 posted all of these to the community userpicks, where people share amusing 
icons they have come across on the Internet. The appearance of this series in the userpicks 
community produced two further icons: 
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Many of these icons are still in relatively common usage over a year later. 
But is it folklore? While these icons are not truly anonymous in origin, they do fit 
Dundes’ criteria of multiple existence and variation. An even more useful way to approach 
this material would be to follow John Dorst’s lead in his examination of joke cycles on the 
Internet. 
It seems to me that my training as a folklorist has predisposed me to view this 
relatively recent phenomenon as a species of the genre JOKE, that is, as a series of separate 
items that can be catalogued and analyzed for recurring themes... But another way to 
approach this phenomenon is to consider the apposite genre not JOKE but CYCLE. From 
this perspective the diagnostic feature of the genre is seriality itself, the potentially infinite 
process of sequential displacement of one unit by its equivalent. And this is a property not 
only operative within a given cycle but between cycles as well, since topical cycles seem to 
replace one another in concert with the serial substitution of news stories in the mass media 
(Dorst: 1990, 183-184). 
Similarly, we can approach the matter of our current items as belonging to the genre 
CYCLE and the species ART, rather than the other way around. The idea that the cycle is 
of prime importance here is reinforced by the peripheral threads of conversation that 
appeared in the comments to the post in which the ‘OMG racecar bling bling!’ 
phenomenon debuted on userpicks. Genepool23 introduces the monkey icons by saying, 
“Witness...The birth of a meme... It starts in a comment by lots42 here in metaquotes, 
where it is seized upon by the masses and captures the imaginations of a generation. Could 
this be the next ‘My hed is Pastede on Yay?’” (genepool23, 2/24/2005) in reference to an 
Internet phenomenon that had sparked its own cycle of icons in 2004, which is still 
expanding in 2006. 
Users recognize the seriality, variability, multiplicity and spread amongst the group 
that these cycles exhibit. 
Genepool23 refers to the cycle as a meme. 
The memetic approach, proposed by Richard Dawkins in 1976, has not been widely 
embraced by the academy. Indeed, Bruce Edmonds declared memetics a failed endeavor 
with the cessation of the Journal of Memetics in 2005. However, memetics has yet to be 
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applied in a direct and thorough way to the study of folklore, and this may still prove to be 
a fruitful union. For Dawkins, memes-- being analogous to their genetic counterparts, 
genes-- are ideas or fragments of ideas which are capable of being replicated as they pass 
from brain to brain and thus are subject to evolution in the form of random mutation and 
selection. 
According to Dawkins, “examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes 
fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches.” (1976: 206) The examples that 
Dawkins gives are strikingly similar to certain forms of folklore that our discipline has 
been concerned with for quite some time. The scope of study of memetics is much wider 
than that of folklore, as anything whatsoever created by imitation falls within the purview 
of it, rather than just that material which fits the narrower definitions of traditionality and 
belonging to the folk. That is to say, all folklore is made up of memes, but not all memes 
are folklore. 
In addition to the sort of inside joke that we’ve just seen, cycles are also frequently 
drawn from popular culture. The line between folklore and popular culture is certainly not 
as clear as it might be, but for my purposes, popular culture consists of items introduced to 
a folk group from without (via television, music, books, etc.) whereas folklore arises 
organically from within the group that uses it. When popular culture is appropriated by the 
folk and becomes subject to modification by members of the group without losing the 
legitimacy that the item enjoys in the eyes of the group, then in my estimation in can be 
considered to have become folklore. For example, if you were to draw Mickey Mouse with 
pointy blue ears, orange shorts, and sandals, most Disney enthusiasts would simply say that 
you have drawn him wrong, rather than that you have added to the repertoire of ways in 
which Mickey Mouse is represented. On the other hand, enthusiasts of the bunny with a 
pancake on its head 
   
are not distressed when the bunny becomes computer generated,  
 
turns into Severus Snape,  
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or Jesus,  
 
   
 
or Buddy Christ from the movie Dogma.  
 
   
Another major source of subject matter for these is corporate marketing. Apple 
computers launched a notable series of commercials in October 2003 advertising their 
portable mp3 player, iPod. These commercials featured silhouetted figures dancing against 
solid brightly colored backgrounds wearing white earbud headphones that stood out against 
the silhouettes. Icons that steal directly from this advertising campaign are extremely 
widespread on LiveJournal. The hundred and seventy such icons that I have collected are 
just a fraction of those that exist. iPod style icons are frequently commented upon in high 
traffic communities. Tutorials on the techniques necessary to create them abound. 
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As Charles Seeger notes (1962: 97), folklore is necessarily a product of plagiarism 
and, while members of the LiveJournal community are usually only concerned with this 
issue as it occurs within their group, the people who do hold legal rights might be 
reasonably expected to be concerned when those rights are infringed upon by anyone in 
any group. Copyright infringement is a hot-button issue in today’s culture. People are very 
concerned that what is theirs be treated as such, particularly given the extent to which 
modern technology enables people to circumvent legal channels for the acquisition of 
intellectual property. 
Apple Computers is a large corporate entity. Their capacity to enforce their 
intellectual property rights far surpass that of the icon maker whose clever idea was stolen 
by another and who threatens legal action against icon thieves. iPod sales were projected to 
top 4 million in the fiscal quarter ending December 2005 alone (Ozanian, 2006). The icons 
in this cycle blatantly steal ideas associated with one of Apple’s most profitable products. 
Many of the icons, such as the one in which a figure has hung himself with an iPod cord, 
are not complementary to their product. It would require very little effort from Apple to 
exercise its rights to the silhouetted figure with white earbuds and lean on LiveJournal in an 
effort to get these icons suppressed. Why does Apple allow its material to be used in this 
way? It is certainly conceivable that Apple is unaware of the existence of this cycle of 
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images, but when the third, tenth, and fourteenth items on the first page of a Google image 
search for “iPod ad” are images that belong to this cycle, this is highly unlikely. Apple’s 
apparent indifference to this appropriation of its materials can most likely be put down to 
the relatively recent phenomenon of viral marketing. The encyclopedia Wikipedia which, 
being user generated, offers emic definitions of phenomena written by people who 
regularly encounter these phenomena, defines viral marketing as follows: 
Viral marketing and viral advertising refer to marketing techniques that seek 
to exploit pre-existing social networks to produce exponential increases in 
brand awareness, through viral processes similar to the spread of an 
epidemic. It is word-of-mouth delivered and enhanced online; it harnesses 
the network effect of the Internet and can be very useful in reaching a large 
number of people rapidly. 
...Viral marketing is sometimes used to describe some sorts of Internet-
based stealth marketing campaigns, including the use of blogs, seemingly 
amateur web sites, and other forms of astroturfing to create word of mouth 
for a new product or service. Often the ultimate goal of viral marketing 
campaigns is to generate media coverage via "offbeat" stories worth many 
times more than the campaigning company's advertising budget. (Wikipedia, 
4/18/2006) 
The present iCon cycle acts as a marvelously discreet form of advertising for 
Apple’s iPod. Whether the iCons are flattering to the product or not, their existence 
propagates the meme of the silhouetted figure with white ear buds that no one denies 
belongs to the Apple iPod, regardless of whether or not they behave as though it does. 
Apple itself does not have to do anything to have this meme brought to the attention of 
thousands of bloggers. The icon makers are doing it for them. 
The viral metaphor is popular in memetics. The idea that “observable culture 
spreads as if it has contagious properties” (Marsden, 1998: 3) follows nicely after the 
notion that ideas perpetuate themselves in the same matter as genes. “Just as we do not 
choose to be infected with, and pass on, biological contagions, we often behave as if we 
have little control over the culture we become infected with and consequently spread” 
(ibid: 5). Many memeticists, including Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore, take the meme 
as selfish gene analogy so seriously that, in their estimation, we do not merely behave as if 
we had little control over the culture we interact with, we in fact have no such control at all. 
Blackmore goes so far as to say that there is no ‘we’ to have any control. In her estimation, 
what people perceive as their ‘selves’ are really complexes of memes that inhabit our heads 
and control our actions, passing themselves from one brain to another as often as they can 
replicate themselves. If we take this view, Apple’s iPod campaign truly is viral. The Apple 
corporation itself is no longer necessary to propagate the iPod meme. 
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This idea of viral marketing, which removes the “choice” of subject from the hands 
of the folk who are actually doing the creating, and placing it under the subtle control of 
corporations who offer memetic ingredients to influence folk culture and bring it in line 
with their marketing goals, is reminiscent of Dorson’s fakelore, although the direction of 
influence seems to have changed. 
Fakelore is the presentation of spurious and synthetic writings under the 
claim that they are genuine folklore. These productions are not collected in 
the field but are rewritten from earlier literary and journalistic sources in an 
endless chain of regurgitation, or they may even be made out of whole cloth, 
as in the case of several of the “folk heroes” written up in the image of Paul 
Bunyan, who had at least some trickle of oral tradition at the beginning of 
his literary exploitation (Dorson, 2004: 285). 
What has changed is the fact that the writings, or drawings in this case, are no 
longer spurious and synthetic. Rather, what we see before us is genuine folklore created for 
the promotion of an agenda by the folk, using tools handed to them by those whose agenda 
they promote. On the whole, this seems to have become a significantly more effective 
method of influencing people than dropping ready-made legends into their laps. Dorson 
saw fakelore as “the sentimentalizing and prettifying of folklore materials” (Dorson, 2004: 
289), which he found preferable to “the ideological manipulation of folklore, a more 
insidious kind of fakelore which so far has made little headway in these States” (ibid.). 
Perhaps Dorson would be surprised to see the extent to which folklore is now being 
manipulated for the promotion of consumerism. 
One of the main arguments levied against memetics by strict Darwinists who are 
not seduced by the notion of the evolution of ideas is that memetic evolution is inherently 
Lamarckian. Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck was an evolutionist who believed that acquired 
characteristics should be inheritable. Sexual reproduction has been proven not to be 
Lamarckian, (rats that have had their tails cut off do not produce tail-less offspring,) and 
many memeticists have treated this as a serious problem with the concept (Blackmore, 
1999:59). In order to decide whether or not this is a problem for memetics as applied to 
folklore, we need to decide whether the evolution of memes is to be regarded as literal, as 
N.K. Humphrey would have it (in Dougherty, 2001:88), or metaphorical as Blackmore sees 
it. Dawkins himself seems unable to reach a firm conclusion on this matter (Dougherty, 
2001: 88-89). If memes truly behaved in the same way as genes, Lamarckian evolution 
would be impossible in memes. Every change in an idea would be the result of random 
mutation. A singer forgets a verse of a song, a cook thinks there is supposed to be ginger in 
this recipe, but the next singer knows the whole song, having learned it from the same sheet 
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music and the next cook has read the recipe more recently and remembers that he should 
not use ginger. 
Susan Blackmore circumvents this problem by distinguishing between ‘copy-the-
instructions’ transmission and ‘copy-the-product’ transmission (1999: 61). Genetic 
evolution can only happen through copy-the-instructions transmission. New bodies are 
created according to the instructions contained within the genes and therefore only random 
mutation of these instructions can influence the next body produced by these instructions. 
Nothing that happens to a body, the genetic product, will be passed on because the 
influence of the instructions on the product is unidirectional. On the other hand, where 
ideas are concerned, the instruction and the product have a much more reciprocal 
relationship. There is nothing to keep one person’s product from becoming the next 
person’s instructions. 
Blackmore’s model is derived from the theory of F. T. Cloak, who says: 
What can be called the i-culture of a people is the set of cultural instructions 
they carry in their central nervous systems. The m-culture of the people 
encompasses the material structures, relationships among material 
structures, and changes in these relationships which are actually brought 
about or maintained by behaviors of those cultural instructions. Features of a 
people’s m-culture thus include features of their behavior, their technology, 
and their social organization (and their ideology when considered as a set of 
verbal behaviors)(Cloak, 1975:168, italics in the original) 
Blackmore’s instructions are equivalent to Cloak’s i-culture, and her products are 
equivalent to his m-culture. It is a useful concept that allowed Dawkins to clarify his idea 
of memetics, specifying that i-culture is more specifically what he means by meme, insofar 
as meme is equivalent to gene, whereas m-culture corresponds to Dawkins’ meme 
products, or in genetic terms, phenotypic effects. 
Nick Rose suspects that Dawkins’ lack of clear distinction between the replicator 
and the phenotype in his original presentation of the idea of memes is that he realized that 
the evolutionary system that he was proposing had Lamarckian qualities, which were 
distasteful to him as a strict Darwinian (Rose, 1998: 4). Both Rose and Blackmore 
tentatively suggest that cultural inheritance may operate under something like a 
Lamarckian system, or that it may occasionally be Lamarckian, but neither seems to want 
to fully acknowledge that, being free from the physical realities that confine the terms of 
genetic inheritance, there is nothing keeping cultural inheritance from behaving in a 
Lamarckian fashion, and that is okay. 
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Indeed, in folkloristics, copy-the-product transmission – which tends to behave in a 
Lamarckian way – is the most important form of transmission. When people insist on 
copying instructions, memorizing folktales from the Grimm’s collections to tell their 
grandchildren, and so forth, cries of ‘inauthentic!’ and ‘folklorismus!’ fill the air. To fit 
most views of authenticity, folklore must evolve in a Lamarckian fashion. I would go 
further and say that in the case of folkloristic memes, Lamarckian evolution is the scholar’s 
ideal. Rose worries that Lamarckism results in copying infidelity and that the instructions 
for creating a given meme phenotype will be replaced by ‘mutant’ instructions that will 
result in ‘mutant’ meme phenotypes and the original meme phenotype will no longer be 
able to be recreated (1998: 5). Aside from the point that evolution is made possible 
specifically through the mutation of instructions, the idea that cultural evolution cannot be 
Lamarckian because evolution requires a higher degree of copying fidelity than 
Lamarckism provides is a flawed assumption. Cultural evolution, at least at the level of 
folklore, is manifestly Lamarckian. Therefore the level of copying fidelity that Lamarckian 
evolution of culture allows is exactly as high as it needs to be. This is a point at which it is 
not useful to cling too strongly to the biological metaphor. The genetic model is extremely 
useful as a point of departure for a theory of the transmission of ideas, but we should be 
wary of adopting too narrowly confined a view of memetic evolution when applying this 
framework to folklore. If taken too far, too literally, it can confine the scope of our thinking 
about folklore to the terms of the hard sciences; and while the social sciences may exhibit a 
predilection for borrowing from the hard sciences for the purpose of gaining institutional 
authority and legitimacy, the fact that they are separate areas of inquiry, and that which 
applies perfectly well to the one does not necessarily apply in its entirety to the other. The 
Lamarkian model of evolution, while not useful to biology is, as we have seen, quite useful 
to folklore. On the other hand, the Darwinian model of evolution is essential to biology and 
useful to folkloristics up until the point where it begins to cause us to dismiss some of what 
we observe. 
Memetic theory gives us a useful model to help us look at how folklore is 
transmitted and how it evolves. Memetics also informs the way that many people in 
Internet communities conceive of their own folklore. The folklore that is to be found on the 
Internet does not consist merely of electronic representations of things to be found in the 
everyday world. The Internet contains a great deal of folklore that is proper to that memetic 
environment. It may take a shift of perspective for the discipline to embrace some of this 
material, but as the Internet increases in importance as a milieu for cultural exchange, it 
will be worth our time to give it our attention. 
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